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Abstract: The European Union has placed great importance on energy policy, namely
on renewable energy, as it plans to phase out fossil fuel sources in the coming decades.
However, the presence of renewable energy has been a constant since the beginning of the
millennium. This thesis aims to assess whether the renewable energy policies introduced
in the EU since 2000 were effective in increasing the deployment of these energy sources.
We find evidence that feed-in policies (tariffs and premiums) and quotas had a significant
effect on renewable energy deployment, while tenders and tax incentives did not have a
significant effect.
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1 Introduction
“I want Europe to become the first climate-neutral continent in the world by 2050.” This
sentence was part of a speech delivered by the recently appointed European Commission
President, Ursula von der Leyen, in her opening statement in the European Parliament. It
was merely a confirmation of what was an already known priority for the European Union
and its members, the environment and climate change. And, as social pressure and public
demonstrations increased, highlighted by the meteoric rise in popularity of activists such
as the Swedish teenager, Greta Thunberg, a formal declaration of intentions was needed.
However, the EU’s concern for the sustainability of the planet was not triggered by this
recent uproar. Instead, it has been present in its institutional decisions for over 20 years.
In 2001, the EU recognised the necessity to promote alternative, less pollutant, re-
newable energy sources for the production of electricity. The European Parliament and
Council issued Directive 2001/77/EC (Communities, 2001), known as the RES directive,
which established national and community targets, clarifying the steps to be taken to
increase the deployment of renewable energy. More recently, this directive was replaced
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by Directive 2009/28/EC (Union, 2009), which updated the renewable energy targets,
setting an ambitious goal of 20% of EU energy having its origin in renewable energy by
requiring each member state to create a national plan to achieve the established targets.
Directive 2009/28/EC (Union, 2009) was the document that guided this past decade’s
renewable energy policy.
Both documents, however, acknowledged that investment in renewable energy was
unlikely to appear organically, due to its low competitiveness, and needed to be publicly
supported.1 As such, it was determined that support schemes should be designed and
implemented, as to increase renewable energy deployment and to facilitate the penetration
of these energy sources.
As the 2010 decade comes to an end and the year of 2020 approaches, the targets are
on track to be met, and in some cases surpassed. The EU and its members were largely
successful in increasing the share of renewable energies. Support schemes implemented in
the beginning of the 21st century are now being modified and its benefits reduced, as RE
becomes more competitive. However, in times where a cycle is ending, a question remains,
were the support schemes effective in deploying renewable energy in the European Union?
In this thesis, we investigate to what extent the instruments used to support RE
were responsible for the increased share of these sources in electricity production. We
analyse a panel of all 27 members of the EU and the United Kingdom, from 2000 to
2017. We divide the instruments into four categories, according to their characteristics
and their focus, and estimate to what degree they have affected changes in capacity
from renewable energy, a proxy for investment in RE. We analyse the total investment
in RE and in three types of energy separately, that is, solar, wind and biomass. Our
results indicate that some support schemes were, in fact, effective in promoting renewable
energy. Particularly, feed-in policies, such as tariffs or premiums, and quota obligations
were found to have a significant effect on the deployment of those energy sources. We
contribute to the literature by analysing the effectiveness of four different instruments
across the 27 members of the EU and the United Kingdom on deployment of total RE
1Negative externalities of fossil fuels were not internalised due to a sluggish ETS market.
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capacity and capacity from three different sources. To the best of our knowledge this is
the first analysis to do so, as other articles have generally focused on analysing at most
two policy instruments or on analysing a single energy source.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses and reviews the literature
on renewable energy policy effectiveness. Section 3 presents and discusses the policy in-
struments in the EU, while Section 4 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 5
presents the empirical approach. Section 6 describes the results and discusses its impli-
cations. Finally, Section 7 concludes the thesis. Tables are included in the appendix.
2 Literature Review
Policies promoting use and deployment of renewable energy sources are relatively recent.
Although the first explicit support policy in Europe was enacted in 1979, in Denmark, the
majority of European countries only followed the Danish example in the 1990s or in the
2000s (Kitzing et al., 2012). Yet, the literature assessing and evaluating the effect of the
policies in the deployment of renewable energy is extensive. Earlier articles relied on a
qualitative approach, analysing countries individually or comparing them. More recently,
and as these policies become effective, research has become more quantitative.
Qualitative articles focused primarily on analysing individual case-studies or the trend
of renewable energy deployment. Bird et al. (2005) was one the earlier articles examining
the effects of policy on the expansion of RE. The authors found that Renewable Portfo-
lio Standards (RPS) and tax incentives were relevant for the deployment of wind power
energy in the US.2 Alagappan et al. (2011) analysed 14 electricity markets across Europe
and North America and concluded that a properly designed feed-in policy produced better
results, when considering installed capacity. Notwithstanding the relevance of the US in
these studies, much focus was devoted to European countries’ policies, namely to the Ger-
man case. Both Mitchell et al. (2006) and Butler and Neuhoff (2008) compare the German
experience with feed-in policies, with the UK’s alternative measures. The former found
that German feed-in policies were more effective than the UK’s quota scheme, as these
2Policy instruments are explained and discussed in Section 3.
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failed to reduce risk for investors. The latter reached a similar conclusion, adding that
feed-in policies delivered better prices and a more competitive environment than quotas.
Lipp (2007) again compared Germany to the UK, but included Denmark, which had also
implemented a feed-in policy scheme. The findings were similar, as evidence showed that
the deployment of renewable energy was larger in both Denmark and Germany. Haas
et al. (2011) produced a comprehensive analysis of the implementation of policies in the
EU, which included case studies about four different types of schemes (feed-in policies,
tenders, investment incentives and quotas) and concluded that feed-in policies were the
most effective scheme for total RE production, as well as solar and wind.
One of the earlier quantitative studies was by Menz and Vachon (2006). Using a panel
of 39 US states, the authors analyse how state and federal policies have contributed to wind
power deployment. They find a positive effect of RPS and green power requirements, a
scheme which requires suppliers to provide green power options to consumers. This study,
however, was based in a short time period. Carley (2009) extended the analysis to all
US states over nine years, finding contradicting results. While RPS had no significant
effect on the share of RE generation, they did increase the total amount generated from
RE. Shrimali and Kniefel (2011) find that policy has a relevant role on the share of
RE capacity. Analysing 50 US states, from 1991 to 2007, the effect of green power
requirements is positive for all types of RE in the analysis (wind, solar, geothermal and
biomass), while RPS only have a positive effect on RE from solar and geothermal sources.
Also, in the US, Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) find different consequences for
different policies. Using a two-step approach (logit and tobit) they conclude that RPS
have a negative effect on RE capacity, while green power requirements have a positive
effect. Yin and Powers (2010) create a variable to account for RPS heterogeneity in the
US and find that it has a positive effect on the share of generation from RE, analysing
all US states between 1993-2006. Hitaj (2013) consider wind power in a 10-year panel of
US counties and find that policy had a significant role in the deployment of wind power
capacity.
Analysing policies in Europe, Jenner et al. (2013) create a variable measuring return
4
on investment to analyse the effect of feed-in polices in solar and wind capacity in 26
EU countries. They find that both sources’ capacity benefits from a feed-in policy and
highlight the importance of policy design, namely the duration of the policy and the
amount of the monetary incentive. Hitaj et al. (2014) also find that feed-in policies
contributed to an increase in wind capacity in German counties. Nicolini and Tavoni
(2017) analyse a 11-year panel for the five largest EU countries across multiple renewable
sources. They find that, although quotas with green certificates are effective, feed-in
policies are better at stimulating both capacity and production in the short and long run.
Kilinc-Ata (2016) combine 50 US states and 27 EU members and analyse them together.
They use four binary variables, representing four different policies, and find that price-
based incentives are better than quantity-based ones, when assessing the effect of policy
on the share of electric capacity from RE sources. To date, we may conclude that most of
the research finds that policy has played a positive role on the deployment of renewable
energy.
3 Policy Instruments
Support schemes directed at renewable energy are often a combination of different types of
policy. These policies can be of a regulatory or of a voluntary nature, direct or indirect,
focused on generation or on investment and can be price or quantity-based. Table 1
describes which criteria each analysed policy instrument meet.





Investment incentives Tendering system for investment grant
Tax credits
Generation focused
Feed-in policies Tendering system for long term contracts
Fixed premium systems Quotas
Source: Adapted from Haas et al. (2011).
There are two relevant distinctions that need to be explicit with regards to policy
instruments. The first is between a regulatory policy and a voluntary policy. As their
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names indicate, a voluntary policy is optional and, as such, its implementation is not
mandatory, while a regulatory policy is binding and applicable from the time it is put
into force. The present analysis will focus on regulatory policies.
The second important distinction is between direct and indirect policies. While the
former aims at achieving an immediate effect on its desired target (renewable energy),
the latter’s objective is to promote a long-term effect and to improve the context for
renewable energy deployment and development. This analysis will focus on direct policy
instruments. Table 2 shows the evolution of the usage of the instruments in the EU.
Table 2: Number of countries with each policy 2000-2017
2000 2005 2010 2015 2017
Feed-in tariff 9 19 22 24 24
Quota 2 6 6 6 5
Tender 3 4 1 2 3
Investment grant/ tax incentive 4 6 6 6 5
Source: Author’s elaboration
3.1 Feed-in Policy
Feed-in policies have been the most popular instrument in the EU throughout the anal-
ysed period and encompass two similar, yet distinct, options: feed-in tariffs and feed-in
premiums. These policies, which offer tariff-based incentives, provide a guarantee to pro-
ducers that all their output will be absorbed by the grid and energy suppliers, reducing
the risk for the investor, and increasing the attractiveness of RE projects.
The main components of a feed-in contract (duration and price) are pre-determined.
The duration of the incentive is determined through one of two ways: either a set number
of years (most commonly, between 15 and 25 years) or until a contracted amount of
production is reached. The price to be received by producers covers both the cost of the
RE project and an expected profit. Moreover, feed-in policies can differentiate between
technologies (e.g wind or solar) and locations of projects to reflect the priorities and
preferences of the regulatory entities.
Feed-in tariffs are the more advantageous instrument from the investor’s perspective.
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They guarantee revenue for the producer, regardless of whether there is demand for their
production, which results in RE producers being exempt from market participation. The
tariff is determined independently of the market and its price.
A feed-in premium scheme differs from a feed-in tariff, since producers interact with
the market and sell their output there, receiving a premium above the market price. The
premium can be fixed or sliding. In the first case, the premium is constant. Because this
implies uncertainty regarding the total value producers receive, either the premium or
total revenue can be bounded, by introducing minimum and maximum values. The latter
implies a variable premium that changes with the evolution of market prices.
3.2 Investment Grant / Tax Incentive
Investment grants and tax incentives are policy instruments that aim at increasing in-
vestment in renewable energy sources. Although their objective is the same, the way in
which they are granted differs.
Investment grants are a scheme in which non-repayable financial support is given to
investors. It does not have a quantity based target, meaning that there are no pre-
determined levels of generation that need to be reached. Instead, grants are given by
project. Financing entities are both national (governmental entities) and supra-national
(EU institutions). The support is contracted in the early stages of the project and its
payment can be delivered at multiple stages of the project, with part of the support being
contingent on the performance of the facility. Typically, the grants cover between 5% to
70% of the total cost incurred.
Tax incentives contain both direct and indirect incentives. However, the latter do
not have the characteristics to be considered a policy instrument in this study, as their
effect is due to internalisation of the external cost. Direct tax incentives are implemented
through a reduction of taxes, either through tax credits, deductions or exemptions. In the




Quota obligations represent a mandatory level of energy from renewable sources that
must be present in the energy portfolio of an entity. The quota of renewable energy
is determined by a government entity, either at a local or national level, and can be
expressed as a percentage of total energy (e.g. 20% of total energy must be produced
using RES) or as a fixed amount of energy (e.g. 6 000 MWh must be produced using
RES). Typically, these obligations fall on grid operators or energy suppliers. In fact,
quotas are an instrument regulating the quantity of renewable energy produced.
To better access compliance with the quota, the method used is the issuance of certifi-
cates, called Tradable Green Certificates (TGC) or Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS),
where each certificate corresponds to a pre-determined amount of renewable energy. In
general, each certificate represents a unit of energy produced using RES. Depending on
the objective of the instrument, TGC schemes can be uniform or banded. In a uniform
TGC scheme, the quota is technology neutral, since each unit of energy equals a certifi-
cate, regardless of which specific technology was used to produce it. Thus, this scheme is
preferred when the purpose is to foster overall investment in RES. On the other hand, a
banded (or differentiated) TGC scheme grants more (or less) certificates for the same unit
of energy, depending on the technology used to produce it. A banded scheme is better
suited when the objective is to prioritise investment in a specific technology.
TGC are tradable and selling them represents an additional source of revenue for
producers. This is intended to incentivise investment in RES and in generation from
them, by making investment profitable. The price of these certificates is determined by
supply and demand in a dedicated market, although in some cases a minimum price can
be set by the regulatory entity. Not meeting the quota carries penalties, which also affects




Tenders are competitive schemes which allocate support for the deployment of renewable
energy projects. The tender process is conducted by public authorities or governmental
entities, that call for bids to be made for a project or group of projects. The projects may
consist of an amount of capacity to be installed, a level of production to be reached or,
less often, the long-term price offered to producers or the growth of production over time.
Each tender has multiple assessment criteria, which are then used to select the winning
bid. Often, the bid with the lowest level of support required is the chosen one. As with
other instruments, a tender can either be technology neutral, not discriminating between
different generation technologies, or technology specific, and favouring a particular one.
Tendering schemes are typically used together with other support schemes, often with
feed-in tariffs or premiums and with investment grants, although they can also be used
in conjunction with quota obligations with TGC.
4 Data
4.1 Data and Sample
We combined publicly available data to create a country-year panel data set, which spans
from 2000 to 2017 and includes all 27 European Union countries and the United Kingdom.
While not being long enough to cover periods where there were no renewable energy policy
instruments enacted in all countries, the sample period does capture significant disparities
in electricity capacity from renewable sources.
4.2 Dependent Variable
Reviewing the literature provided us with various possible options for a variable that
represented the deployment of renewable energy and its influence in electricity production.
Our choice is Added Capacity from renewable energy sources (Hitaj, 2013), as it is
superior to outright capacity from renewable energy or any renewable electricity ratio
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(Jenner et al., 2013). The latter was disregarded because the use of a ratio entails changes
to the variable, which would fall outside of our interest, while support schemes’ objectives
lie in the promotion of renewable energy and not on its weight on total production. The
former was ignored because, in order to successfully evaluate the effect of a policy, we
must exclude previous investments in capacity, to disregard any possible trend.
The installed capacity does not include hydropower as one of its sources. This is due
to concerns regarding the environmental impact of this source (Brunnschweiler, 2010),
as well as the fact that most support schemes are not directed at hydropower projects.
The renewable sources included are photovoltaic (solar), wind and biomass. The data
were collected from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) database and
is measured in gigawatt (GW).
4.3 Renewable Energy Policies
To assess the effect of regulatory action on renewable energy deployment we use a set
of binary policy variables (Carley (2009) and Kilinc-Ata (2016)), representing whether
a policy was enacted in a country, in which case it assumes a value of 1, or it was not
enacted, assuming a value of 0. The variable remains with a value of 1 for as many years
as the policy was effective. There are four binary variables, each corresponding to an
instrument detailed in Section 3. For a policy to be considered enacted and effective,
it need not be applicable to all renewable energy sources. For example, should a feed-
in policy be available exclusively for photovoltaic energy, the policy variable for feed-in
policies will take the value of 1.
One disadvantage of the setting described above is that it disregards within policy
heterogeneity. Indeed, policies can vary in more instances than just type, such as the
technology they target or the mechanism within each type. To mitigate this adversity, we
also include energy specific policy variables. These variables are similar to those above,
with the exception that for their value to be 1 the policy must be enacted for a single
energy source.
The data for the construction of these variables were collected from multiple sources,
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which were then compared and combined, to assemble the most accurate database. The
sources used were the IEA/IRENA Policy and Measures Database, CEER reports and
Held et al. (2015).
4.4 Control Variables
We include several control variables that affect the decision to add productive capacity
from renewable energies. The control variables can be divided into two groups: socio-
economic variables and energy variables.
Socio-economic Variables: GDP per capita represents the natural logarithm
of Gross Domestic Product per capita, in PPP dollars at constant prices. It objective
is to control for income and wealth effects on RE deployment. These effects can be
twofold. First, higher income could translate into more availability for the promotion
of environmentally friendly energy options, such as RE sources. Second, higher income
could imply a greater use of non-renewable energy sources, resulting from improved living
standards more easily achieved by maintaining fossil fuel sources. The data were collected
from the World Bank database.
Left represents the political leaning and environmental preference of a country’s cit-
izens. It value equals the percentage of votes given to left-wing parties. Traditionally,
environmental causes have been associated with left-wing parties, which would point
towards a higher representation of left-wing parties translating into more support for in-
vestment in RE capacity. Although seldom used as a variable, Fabrizio (2012) and Hitaj
et al. (2014) obtained interesting results from it. The data were collected from the Parl-
Gov database (Döring and Manow, 2018), and the built-in left-right index (0-10, with 0
representing far-left and 10 far-right) was used to sort the seats. A party was considered
to be left-wing if the index was below 5.3
The binary variable EU Member identifies whether a country is a member of the
European Union (1), or is not a member (0). The decision to include this variable lies in
the fact that there were considerable changes in the number of member states of the EU
3In election years, the percentage is considered to be of that year only if the election occurred in the
first semester.
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during our sample period. As such, it should be controlled for whether being an effective
member has an impact on capacity additions. The data were collected from the European
Commission.
Population Density denotes the number of people per square kilometre. It is
related to the potential for the creation of new production units, as land availability is
an important factor for the deployment of new equipment to capture the power from
renewable sources. Lower population density indicates greater land availability, which
facilitates investment and construction of sites, such as wind farms or photovoltaic power
plants. The data were collected from Eurostat.
Energy Variables: The Electricity Consumption variable quantifies the amount
of electricity consumed in terawatt hour (TWh). The reason for its use relates to its
characteristics as a proxy for market size and demand. The data were collected from
Eurostat.
CO2 emissions quantifies the emissions of carbon dioxide, in tonnes, per capita. We
include it in the control variables since the the production of energy from non-renewable
sources causes emission of harmful compounds which have a local impact. As such, this
variable proxies those emissions. Higher levels of CO2 (and by extension, pollutants from
energy production) create less desirable living conditions and are thus associated with
social pressure towards less polluting energy sources, such as RE sources.4 The data were
collected from the European Environment Agency database.
Share of Fossil Fuels controls for the amount of electricity produced from fossil fuels
in TWh. Sovacool (2009) show that the transition towards RE sources is constrained by
the strength of fossil sources and the socio-technological barriers they pose. This pressure
could be either economic or political, through lobbying. As such, higher shares of fossil
fuels should reduce the willingness to add RE capacity. The data for this variable were
collected from Eurostat.
Table 7 in the appendix outlines the variables described above. Table 3 presents the
summary statistics.
4Reduced levels of CO2 emissions determine lower levels of local pollutants.
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Added Capacity (Total) 476 .620 1.475 0 11.098
Added Capacity (Wind) 476 .329 .736 0 6.125
Added Capacity (Solar) 476 .230 .893 0 9.539
Added Capacity (Biomass) 476 .069 .156 0 1.045
Total
Feed-in Policy 476 .712 .453 0 1
Quota 476 .195 .397 0 1
Tender 476 .086 .281 0 1
Tax incentive 476 .195 .397 0 1
Wind
Feed-in Policy 476 .611 .488 0 1
Quota 476 .195 .397 0 1
Tender 476 .082 .275 0 1
Tax incentive 476 .166 .372 0 1
Solar
Feed-in Policy 476 .668 .471 0 1
Quota 476 .180 .385 0 1
Tender 476 .053 .223 0 1
Tax incentive 476 .183 .389 0 1
Biomass
Feed-in Policy 476 .655 .476 0 1
Quota 476 .195 .397 0 1
Tender 476 .057 .232 0 1
Tax incentive 476 .153 .361 0 1
GDP per capita 476 10.333 .404 9.143 11.491
Left 476 .435 .104 .163 .726
EU Member 476 .887 .317 0 1
Population Density 476 171.065 244.745 17 1495.299
Electricity Consumption 476 102.163 137.745 1.569 547.284
CO2 Emission 476 8.605 3.971 3.243 28.760
Share of Fossil Fuels 476 90.663 133.842 .221 543.921
5 Empirical Approach
Analysing our dependent variable, Added Capacity , and its distribution, we conclude
that the most appropriate method is the Tobit model, first introduced in Tobin (1958).
Since in some observations, there are no additions to capacity, the dependent variable is
censored and has a value of zero with positive probability. The estimator for the random-
effect Tobit model is obtained through maximum-likelihood.
Let latent renewable energy capacity additions, y∗it, depend on the vector Xit, which
contains both the policy variables and the control variables described in Section 4. Then,
y∗it = Xitβ + εit,where εit ∼ N(0, σ2) (1)
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and
εit = νi + ηit (2)






0, if y∗it ≤ 0.
(3)
The error term εit consists of a time-invariant country-specific random effect νi and an
idiosyncratic error ηit that varies over time and across countries. Moreover, we assume
that ∀ i 6= j, t 6= s:
E[νiνj] = 0, νi ∼ N(0, σ2ν) (4)
E[ηitηis] = 0, ηit ∼ N(0, σ2η) (5)
and that the country-specific random effect νi is orthogonal to Xit. This assumption
implies that any unobserved time-invariant country-specific variables that affect renewable
energy deployment and that are not included in the estimation would be contained in the
error term νi.
The zero covariance assumption means that the error term is uncorrelated across
countries or over time.
We will apply this approach at two instances. First, we consider the added capacity
from all RE sources. Second, we will divide the analysis into three distinct energy sources,
wind, solar and biomass. This allows us to capture potential policy heterogeneity.
6 Results and discussion
6.1 Total renewable capacity
Table 4 reports the results of the Tobit estimation of capacity additions as a function
of RE policies and controls. Column (1) presents the estimations when all policies are
considered simultaneously, while columns (2) to (5) present the results when each policy
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is considered separately. All specifications use the same control variables.
Table 4: Tobit marginal effects - total RE
Dependent Variable Capacity Additions (GW)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Feed-in Policy, (0/1) 0.592*** 0.496***
(0.158) (0.144)
Quota, (0/1) 0.623** 0.444
(0.287) (0.304)
Tender, (0/1) 0.014 -0.146
(0.174) (0.172)
Tax incentive, (0/1) 0.080 -0.069
(0.177) (0.175)
GDP per capita, ln -0.288 -0.285 -0.200 -0.203 -0.209
(0.355) (0.344) (0.370) (0.359) (0.359)
Left, % 0.656 0.585 0.804 0.746 0.721
(0.614) (0.611) (0.620) (0.619) (0.621)
EU Member, (0/1) 0.136 0.190 0.380** 0.403** 0.390**
(0.203) (0.200) (0.193) (0.192) (0.193)
Electricity Consumption, TWh 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Population Density, population/km2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CO2 emissions, tonnes per capita 0.030 0.023 0.007 0.006 0.006
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Share of Fossil Fuels, (TWh) -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 1.308 1.489 0.772 0.890 0.976
(3.455) (3.341) (3.619) (3.494) (3.490)
Countries 28 28 28 28 28
Observations 476 476 476 476 476
Censored Observations 53 53 53 53 53
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and at 1% respectively.
Although not the main subject of this study, we will briefly explore the control vari-
ables’ results, as their coefficients point towards noteworthy findings. The first result is
that the direction of the coefficients does not change across specifications and there are
only marginal changes in their significance. GDP per capita is shown to have a negative,
albeit not significant, effect in deployment of RE capacity. Theoretically, one would ex-
pect wealthier countries to possess better conditions for the deployment of RE, not only in
investment capability, but also in willingness to pay higher commodity prices. However,
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considering that all countries in the sample are, ultimately, EU members, and the EU
has set ambitious RE targets, both at a national and EU level, the insignificant GDP
coefficient is not disturbing and has been found in the literature (Jenner et al., 2013). Co-
incidentally, the statement above finds support in the results obtained for the EU member
binary variable, which shows a positive effect in fostering RE capacity, despite not being
significant in two of the five specifications. The political tendency of a country is not
statistically significant in RE deployment. This result coincides with the findings in Hitaj
et al. (2014) for Germany, but opposes to those of Fabrizio (2012) for the United States,
who found a significant effect of political tendency on RE deployment. This makes clear
that the ideological difference regarding environmental issues is not as strong in the EU,
as it is across the US.
The estimates on electricity consumption are significant and positive. Our model esti-
mates a 0.032 GW increase in capacity per each additional TWh of electricity consumed.
Indeed, electricity consumption could have either a positive or negative effect, depend-
ing on which type of source was used to meet the higher demand, resulting from higher
consumption. The positive results indicate that RE sources are used more extensively to
supply this increase, in the margin. Population density was used to proxy the RE poten-
tial of a country. Its result does not coincide with the initial expectation. However, since
this variable combines both area and population, it may be case that a higher density
level can be due to either higher population or lower land area. In any case, the result is
not significant and close to zero.5 Emissions of carbon dioxide have no significant effect
on RE deployment. This result follows the literature in both the sign and significance
(Kilinc-Ata, 2016) and could be explained by a conflict between social awareness and
pressure towards less pollutant alternatives and disengagement regarding environmental
causes. Finally, a higher share of fossil fuels has a negative effect on RE capacity, with
similar results found in Nicolini and Tavoni (2017) and Jenner et al. (2013). An addi-
tional TWh of electricity generated from fossil sources decreases renewable capacity by
0.026 GW. Two possible explanations arise. The first highlights the effect of lobbying in
5The variable Area was used as an alternative proxy. Its results were similar.
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maintaining fossil fuel sources. The second relates to the fact that fossil sources are a
substitute to RE, and as such, more usage of fossil energy does not exhaust the existing
RE capacity and does not push for its increase.6
The estimates for the policy binary variables suggest that feed-in policies and quota
incentives have a positive effect on RE deployment. On the other hand, tenders and
investment grants and tax-based incentives do not seem to produce a significant effect
on RE capacity. Moreover, the positive effect of feed-in policies extends to the separate
specification, while the in the same setting, quota incentives yield no significant effect.
The results concerning feed-in policies are no surprise. Our model estimates an increase
of 0.592 GW in total renewable capacity when the scheme is present. Not only are they the
most used policy instrument in the EU, but evidence of its effectiveness has been widely
reported in the literature. For instance Nicolini and Tavoni (2017) find a decisive effect
of feed-in policies in RE deployment. The estimated coefficients regarding quota policies
present an interesting dichotomy. When estimated in conjunction with the other types
of policies, its effect is positive and significant, even surpassing that of feed-in policies, of
0.623 GW of capacity. When estimated alone, it is found to have no significant effect in
RE deployment. These results suggest that there may exist a complementary/substitute
effect and highlight the importance of finding coherent and non-competing policy designs
to reach the desired outcome (Zhao et al., 2013). Both feed-in and quota policies produce
a larger effect when estimated together, which may indicate these policies have some
complementary effects.
6.2 Wind capacity
Column (1) of Table 5 presents the results of the estimation where the dependent variable
is added capacity from wind power, which includes both onshore and offshore capacity.
The coefficients for the policy variables are disappointing. No policy has a significant effect
on the deployment of wind power capacity. While the result for tenders and tax incentives
(since it is consistent with the main model) and for quotas (due to its higher sensitivity)
6An estimation with share of renewable fuels instead of share of fossil fuels yielded a positive and
significant effect.
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Table 5: Tobit marginal effects - energy specific
Dependent Variable Capacity Additions (GW)
Wind Solar Biomass
(1) (2) (3)
Feed-in Policy, (0/1) 0.121 0.468*** 0.081***
(0.090) (0.171) (0.028)
Quota, (0/1) 0.219 0.114 0.123***
(0.154) (0.197) (0.036)
Tender, (0/1) -0.084 0.166 -0.073**
(0.101) (0.214) (0.036)
Tax incentive, (0/1) -0.006 -0.129 0.035
(0.129) (0.151) (0.031)
GDP per capita, ln 0.078 0.060 0.022
(0.210) (0.259) (0.045)
Left, % 0.194 -0.016 0.189**
(0.343) (0.515) (0.089)
EU Member, (0/1) 0.135 0.777*** 0.041
(0.117) (0.280) (0.034)
Electricity Consumption, TWh 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.001***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Population Density, population/km2 -0.000 0.0003* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CO2 emissions, tonnes per capita 0.006 0.025 0.001
(0.017) (0.024) (0.004)
Share of Fossil Fuels, (TWh) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant -1.396 -2.496 -0.474
(2.045) (2.479) (0.432)
Countries 28 28 28
Observations 476 476 476
Censored Observations 111 154 147
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and at 1% respectively.
are not a surprise, the insignificance of feed-in policies is surprising. Interestingly, the
results of the control variables are similar to those found in the main model.
6.3 Solar capacity
Column (2) of Table 5 presents the results for the estimation where the dependent variable
is added capacity from solar power. Unlike in the model analysing total RE capacity, only
feed-in policies have a significant effect on the capacity of RE from solar power, increasing
it by 0.468 GW. The three remaining policies are not significant for solar power.
The results of the control variables remain largely the same. There is, however, a
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significant effect of population density, which is small and close to zero, and a positive
effect of EU membership. This result indicates an increase of 0.777 GW in solar capacity.
6.4 Biomass capacity
Column (3) of Table 5 presents the results of the estimation where the dependent vari-
able is added capacity from biomass power. This estimation is the one where the policy
instruments are most effective. As in the main model, feed-in policies and quota obliga-
tions produce a positive and significant effect on biomass capacity. The existence of these
schemes translates into an increase of 0.081 GW and 0.123 GW, respectively. However,
in the biomass power case, tenders are found to have a negative effect, decreasing capac-
ity by 0.073 GW. This result further reinforces the previously mentioned importance of
policy design and the existence of non-competing policies, as tenders are schemes which
are commonly combined with other policies.
The control variables’ results are similar, with the exceptions being the not significant
effect of the share of fossil fuels and the positive and highly significant effect of the political
tendency. In the case of biomass power, higher support for left-wing parties translates
into higher biomass energy capacity. This result, and its departure from the findings of
the main model, may be explained by this energy’s characteristics, which rely less on the
natural endowment of a country and more on the waste management policy.
6.5 Robustness
In this section, we conduct several robustness tests on our results. We abstain from using
a different dependent variable for two reasons. First, as outlined in Section 4, because
other capacity metrics do not have the characteristics desired for this analysis. Second,
because the alternative variable Added Generation is not suitable for a Tobit model.
Instead, we test the robustness of our results by re-estimating our model with different
methods. We re-estimate it using an OLS approach, with both random and fixed effects,









Feed-in Policy, (0/1) 0.451*** 0.329** 0.876***
(0.142) (0.148) (0.281)
Quota, (0/1) 0.299 0.945*** 0.633*
(0.221) (0.300) (0.379)
Tender, (0/1) 0.029 0.025 -0.297
(0.164) (0.164) (0.333)
Tax incentive, (0/1) 0.015 0.140 0.358
(0.156) (0.173) (0.267)
GDP per capita, ln -0.419 -0.242 0.827*
(0.302) (0.460) (0.477)
Left, % 0.268 0.800 -0.607
(0.542) (0.593) (0.854)
EU Member, (0/1) -0.125 -0.128 0.561*
(0.179) (0.196) (0.317)
Electricity Consumption, TWh 0.031*** 0.043*** -0.010
(0.003) (0.008) (0.007)
Population Density, population/km2 0.000 0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
CO2 emissions, tonnes per capita 0.036 0.041 -0.038
(0.026) (0.039) (0.039)
Share of Fossil Fuels, (TWh) -0.025*** -0.033*** 0.017**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
Constant 3.239 0.693 -7.886*
(2.906) (4.478) (4.464)
Countries 28 28 28
Observations 476 476 476
Error Structure RE FE RE
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and at 1% respectively.
Columns (1) and (2) presents the results of the OLS estimation with random effects
and fixed effects, respectively. In the random effects specification, only feed-in policies are
significant, having a positive effect which increases capacity. In the fixed effects specifi-
cation, both feed-in policies and quotas are significant and increase capacity. Column (3)
presents the estimations of the Probit model. The existence of both feed-in policies and
quotas, increase the likelihood of capacity from RE being increased. These robustness




Although our results are consistent and robust, they must be interpreted with care, as
there may be limitations to the model and to our empirical methods. First, the variables
used to assess the effect of policy schemes may have limitations in evaluating them. While
binary variables prove to be useful, they are rudimentary, since they evaluate the effect
in added capacity of a simple scenario, whether the policy exists or not. An alternative
avenue for future research on the topic of support schemes’ effectiveness could be to use
other measures of policy, such as the amount of the tariff or premium, in the case of
feed-in policies, or the required quota, in the case of quota obligations.
Second, the analysis can suffer from an endogeneity problem, as a simultaneity bias can
occur between the existence of the variables and the decision to invest and add RE capac-
ity. Despite that, it does not yet exist an accessible method to address endogeneity, using
instrumental variables, in a panel data random effects Tobit model, we attempted an OLS
instrumental variable approach. Although the endogeneity hypothesis was supported, our
choice was not to analyse and discuss the estimates obtained, since the instruments proved
to be faulty and not valid.7 Nevertheless, as IV estimation techniques are developed and
better instruments are uncovered, endogeneity, and its correction, could be a further step
in the evaluation of policy effectiveness.
7 Conclusion
In this thesis, we investigated to what extent the instruments used to support RE in
the EU contributed to the increased share of these sources in electricity production. In
particular, We analysed a panel of all 27 members of the European Union and United
Kingdom between 2001 and 2017.
Our findings are twofold. First, we find that not all policies are effective. In fact,
tenders and tax incentives and investment grants produced no significant effects on the
deployment of total RE. On the other hand, feed-in policies and quotas did have a positive
7Tables 8 and 9 in the appendix present the variables used as IVs and the results of the IV estimation,
respectively.
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effect on total RE deployment. Of these two, feed-in policies proved to be the most
effective scheme. Second, by analysing all four policies together and separately, we find
better results when they are analysed together.
We also control for policy heterogeneity and analyse three different RE sources sep-
arately. For wind power, no policy proved to significantly contribute to its deployment.
For solar power, only feed-in policies were found to be an effective scheme. For biomass
power, both feed-in policies and quotas were effective, whereas tenders were found to have
a deterring effect.
These results allow us to draw important conclusions regarding policy interactions
(complementarity/substitutability) and design. That is, when implemented simultane-
ously, policies must have clear targets (i.e. the specific projects or energy types they are
aimed at) and objectives (e.g. reach a 20% share of renewable energy by 2020) and must
not compete with each other. In fact, in case two properly designed policies co-exist, they
can complement one another and ultimately achieve better results. These findings are
relevant for future policy design. They show that no policy has a “one size fits all” and
that, although policies not targeting a specific source can be effective, tailored policies
produce more effective results.
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Appendices
Table 7: Variables in the analysis
Variable Unit Source
Dependent Variable Added Capacity GW IRENA
Explanatory Variables
Feed-in Policy Binary





GDP per capita natural logarithm, constant 2011$ World Bank
Left Percentage ParlGov
EU Member Binary European Commission
Population Density population/km2 Eurostat
Electricity Consumption TWh Eurostat
CO2 emissions tonnes per capita European Environment Agency
Share of Fossil Fuels TWh Eurostat
Table 8: Instrumental Variables
Variable Unit Source




Environmental Tax Revenue Percentage of GDP Eurostat
Energy Import Dependency Percentage Eurostat
CH4 emissions tonnes per capita of CO2 equivalent European Environment Agency
N2O emissions tonnes per capita of CO2 equivalent European Environment Agency
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Table 9: IV estimation
Dependent Variable Capacity Additions (GW)
OLS IV
(1) (2)
Feed-in Policy, (0/1) 0.329** 1.479***
(0.148) (0.524)
Quota, (0/1) 0.945*** 1.984
(0.300) (1.892)
Tender, (0/1) 0.025 1.195
(0.164) (0.813)
Tax incentive, (0/1) 0.140 2.562**
(0.173) (1.127)
GDP per capita, ln -0.242 -0.231
(0.460) (0.842)
Left, % 0.800 0.875
(0.593) (0.803)
EU Member, (0/1) -0.128 -0.717**
(0.196) (0.361)
Electricity Consumption, TWh 0.043*** 0.049***
(0.008) (0.010)
Population Density, population/km2 0.000 -0.011*
(0.003) (0.006)
CO2 emissions, tonnes per capita 0.041 0.045
(0.039) (0.061)





Number of code 28 28
Error Structure FE FE
Test for endogeneity (p-value) 0.002
Test for valid instruments (p-value) 0.015
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and at 1% respectively.
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